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This paper considers an intertemporal decision problem in which the agent
has limited foresight. It o⁄ers an interpretation of why people may smoke
when they are young - and arguably have a short horizon of foresight - and
refrain from smoking when they get older - and their foresight is better.1 Introduction
Two important strands of literature have considered the problem of attitude
toward smoking. On the one hand, the theory of addiction suggests that the
more you have smoked in the past, the more smoking is preferred to non-
smoking (even though in absolute terms it may be worse than having never
smoked). According to this theory, if agents are fully rational, they should
anticipate this and refrain from smoking in the ￿rst place (if the long run
consequences of smoking today are su¢ ciently bad). On the other hand, the
theory of hyperbolic discounting postulates that agents keep valuing imme-
diate rewards excessively high as compared with what standard exponential
discounting would deliver. According to this theory, even if agents are fully
rational they may prefer smoking today because this delivers an instanta-
neous pleasure that may o⁄set the long run consequences (according to the
current period criterion).
Neither of these approaches challenges the cognitive ability of agents to
understand the consequences of their current consumption decisions for their
future consumption decisions. We propose to revisit the problem of the at-
titude toward smoking by considering agents that have limited foresight and
understand only how their current consumption decisions a⁄ect the pattern
of consumption over a limited future (as opposed to the entire future). In
our model, discounting takes the usual exponential form and we allow for
changing preferences that are a⁄ected by past consumptions (as in models of
addiction).
Our main interest lies in showing the e⁄ects of a change in the horizon
of foresight of agents. As it turns out, agents with short or intermediate
horizons of foresight might smoke or cycle between smoking and non-smoking
whereas agents with su¢ ciently long horizons of foresight will refrain from
smoking, as we assume that non-smoking is the optimal plan of action under
perfect foresight. The limited foresight perspective adopted in this paper
has policy implications that di⁄er from those suggested by other approaches
- in particular the hyperbolic discounting approach. In our framework, a very
long horizon of foresight is always good for the agent. So, if it were possible to
make agents more aware of the long run e⁄ects of their current consumption
decisions, this would unambiguously lead to a welfare improvement in our
setup. This is not so in the hyperbolic discounting paradigm in which it is
assumed that agents have perfect foresight (there taxes on cigarettes may be
the only tool to align the instantaneous criterion of the agent with his long
1run well being as assumed by the planner).1
Studies of attitudes towards smoking are an important source of evidence
that agents are subject to limited foresight, with their foresight horizons dif-
fering depending on how experienced they are. For example, if agents were
rational and there were no material shocks a⁄ecting the average tendency
to smoke, then people￿ s expectations of their likelihood of being smokers in
future years should, on average, correspond to the numbers of these individ-
uals that actually are smokers. Yet, according to US DHHS 1994 data, as
reported in Loewenstein et al. (2003), only 15 percent of high school students
that were occasional smokers (whom we interpret as less experienced people)
predicted that they might be smoking in ￿ve years, when in fact 42 percent
were still smoking ￿ve years later. By comparison, 68 percent of high school
students that were heavy smokers (whom we interpret as more experienced
people) predicted that they would still smoking be smoking in ￿ve years,
while 80 percent were still smoking ￿ve years later. Assuming that there
were no material shocks increasing the aggregate tendency to smoke in the
period of this study, these results constitute evidence for limited foresight
among young smokers, with the foresight error being far less severe for heavy
(more experienced) young smokers than for light (less experienced) young
smokers.
Studies of smoking also provide indicative evidence regarding the e⁄ect of
age on forecasting abilities. For example, we note the following from the UK
Department of Health Smoking-related behaviour and attitudes survey, 2003
and the National Statistics database of trends in smoking, 1974-2003. First
we note that signi￿cantly higher proportions of the population smoke when
20-24 than when older - for example, in 2003, 36 per cent compared with 25
per cent of 50-59 year-olds and and only 15 per cent of 60 and overs. Next,
we note that signi￿cant numbers of people give up when relatively young.
Some 20-25 per cent of smokers give up between the ages of 20-24 and 35-49
(e.g. for 2003 36 per cent of 20-24 year-olds smoke, whilst only 30 per cent
of 35-49 year-olds smoke). Some of this giving up occurs between 24 and 35
(In the data, after 1982, in every year except 2000, there are fewer smokers
at 25-34 than at 20-24). Though many other factors change as one ages (e.g.
children may arrive), the important scale of giving-up occurring between the
very young and slightly older age-groups is at least consistent with the view
1In our setup, taxes on cigarettes could hurt agents with perfect foresight who would
￿nd it optimal to smoke taking into account all the consequences of smoking.
2that greater experience, of some sort, is important. Next we note that in
Table 3.21 of Smoking-related behaviour and attitudes, 2003, 57 per cent of
16-24 year old smokers who intend to stop smoking are reported to respond
they might or might not be smoking in a year, whereas the same ￿gure is only
35 per cent for 25-44 years old - perhaps indicative that a high proportion
of this young age group has a horizon of foresight of less than a year whilst
more of the older age group has a longer horizon. Of course, more systematic
econometric investigations would be required to produce robust results, but,
taken together, our theory linking forecasting abilities to smoking attitudes
seems, at least on the face of it, consistent with these data.
In the rest of the paper, we de￿ne a solution concept to describe the
consumption choices of agents who are subject to limited foresight. Our
modelling approach follows Jehiel (1995): Agents are assumed to make cor-
rect forecasts within their of horizon of foresight,2 and they extrapolate from
their discounted sum of payo⁄s obtained within their horizon of foresight to
form a simple decision making criterion based on the limited forecast. We
also suggest a re￿nement of the solution concept based on the idea that agents
tend to prefer controlling their plans of action as far ahead as possible. Next
we use our setup to generate examples in which the decision of whether to
smoke or not to smoke is sensitive to the horizon of foresight and/or in which
cycling behaviour between smoking and non-smoking may emerge as an equi-
librium phenomenon. Then we relate our approach to other approaches in
the literature and o⁄er a conclusion.
2 Setup
A decision-maker faces in￿nitely-many stages, with a decision to make at
each stage. His decision in each period t consists in a choice of action at 2 A





where !t 2 ￿ is a state variable, U (at;!t) is the ￿ ow of payo⁄ derived by
the agent in period t, and ￿ is the discount factor between periods.
2A rationale for the correctness assumption might be based on learning considerations,
see Jehiel (1998).
3The state evolves according to a deterministic process mapping the pe-
riod t pro￿le of state !t and action at onto the period t + 1 state !t (i.e.,




where !t = ! denotes the period t state and at+l = al
the period t + l action.
We note that in a standard paradigm with perfect foresight there is no
￿ time inconsistency￿problem - that is to say, once a plan of what to do in
the future is formed, when the decision-maker gets there he doesn￿ t change
his mind. What he thought would be the best thing to do in the future
continues to be the best thing to do once the future becomes the present.
This is due to the fact that discounting takes an exponential form so that
the marginal rate of substitution (in terms of overall preference) between an
increase of utility in period t and an increase of utility in period t + k does
not change with the time period t. This is a generalization of a result ￿rst
noted by Strotz (1956).
3 The limited foresight approach
We turn now to describing the decision making of an agent with limited
foresight. We ￿rst review the basic concepts and then o⁄er some preliminary
results.
3.1 Concepts
In a limited foresight problem, the decision-maker can see ahead only n
periods (including the current period), and forms no view as to what happens
beyond the horizon of foresight. The following de￿nition (in the spirit of
Jehiel 1995) describes how an agent with limited foresight behaves.
De￿nition 1 A stream of actions fat (!)gt;! is a ￿ limited foresight n-equilibrium￿
3Our insights would extend to more general stochastic processes. We chose a deter-
ministic formulation for expositional purposes.
4(or ￿ LFE-n￿ ) if and only if4, 8t;!;

























The idea behind the limited foresight equilibrium is that at each point in
time and whatever the state ! the agent understands the e⁄ect of his current
consumption decision over the next n periods but not further ahead. So at
time t, his foresight horizon covers consumption decisions from periods t+1
to t+n￿1, and as one moves on to the next period t+1, his foresight horizon
covers consumption decisions from periods t + 2 to t + n. Such an idea of
rolling (limited) foresight is reminiscent of how a chess player would usually
simplify the analysis of the huge game tree generated after most non-trivial
board positions, and we believe it is likely to apply to most interactions with
su¢ ciently complex decision/game trees.
We assume that the agent￿ s forecast is correct within his horizon of fore-
sight, which is re￿ ected in the fact that the period t expectation b ak for period
t + k (rightly) corresponds to the e⁄ective agent￿ s consumption decision in
period t + k given the consumption decision a considered in period t and




The correctness assumption is clearly an extreme and idealized assumption,
and would be problematic if we thought of it as a result of introspective
calculus.6 Our view of this assumption is in terms of learning. The agent
4We restrict attention to deterministic action schemes that may only depend on the
time period t and the current state !, hence at(!). Following Jehiel (1995), it can be shown
that this is without loss of generality, as long as the agent￿ s choice of action is deterministic
and cannot (directly) depend on actions that took place more than N periods earlier (i.e.,
as long as the agent has bounded recall).
5Note that !k depends on a for k ￿ 1, so b ak depends on a too.
6If the agent were able in period t + 1 to make correct forecast till period t + n as a
result of introspective calculus it seems hard to justify why he could not have made this
calculus in period t thus implying that his period t￿ s forecast should cover one more period
than we assume. By a simple unravelling argument, this line of thought should imply that
the agent has perfect foresight over the entire future.
5is viewed as inferring from his own past experiences and the experiences of
his fellow smokers and non-smokers his smoking attitude in a limited time
frame. For example, if our agent has a one-year horizon of foresight, he is
viewed as correctly assessing his ability to stop smoking within a year time
when he starts or continues smoking now, and he would also correctly assess
his chance of smoking again within a year time if he refrains from smoking
for a week time. But, the agent would have no correct expectation about his
smoking attitude beyond one year. The agent is then viewed as making his
current period consumption decision so as to maximize his expected payo⁄
within his foresight horizon. That is, the agent somehow ignores the time
periods over which he has no foresight.7 It seems reasonable to suppose that
an older or more experienced agent is likely to have a longer horizon of fore-
sight (as in chess), and in our application we will be interested in the e⁄ect
of increasing the horizon of foresight on the consumption patterns that can
possibly emerge in equilibrium (i.e. that can be stable points of the implicit
learning model suggested above).
In the above equilibrium concept, the agent is assumed to choose his cur-
rent consumption only (as opposed to a consumption plan within his horizon
of foresight). The limited horizon forecast is only a means through which
the agent can elaborate the best decision for the current period; it is not a
choice of the agent.8 The next de￿nition (which is new to this paper) sug-
gests considering a scenario in which the agent would choose his consumption
decisions within the next p periods with the additional constraints that the
agent does not change his mind when these periods come about (i.e. so as
to avoid time inconsistencies issues).
De￿nition 2 A stream of actions fat (!)gt;! is a ￿ p-controlled n-equilibrium￿
(or ￿ LFE-(p;n)￿ ) if and only if, 8t;!












B. b ak = at+k
￿
!k￿
for p ￿ 1 < k ￿ n ￿ 1 and
7There are alternative views. For example, an agent could be parameterized by how
optimistic he is about what is to come beyond his horizon of foresight. This would give
rise to alternative criteria (see Jehiel (2001) for the study of such alternative criteria in
the context of repeated games).
8This modeling device is in the spirit of Strotz (1956), and it is meant to avoid time
inconsistency problems.
6C. ak = at+k
￿
!k￿










￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
ak for k ￿ p
b ak for k > p
In this case we divide the foresight horizon into a period over which the
decision-maker plans what to do, p (which we shall refer to as his ￿ planning
horizon￿ ), and the period over which he merely has exogenous expectations
of what he will do, n ￿ p.
The interpretation of De￿nition 2 is as follows. Condition A means that
in every period t and in all states !, the agent chooses an optimal plan
a0;:::;ap￿1 over his planning horizon given his expectations b ap;:::;b an￿1 about
what will happen next within his horizon of foresight. Condition B expresses
the idea that expectations b ap;:::;b an￿1 are correct, while condition C expresses
the idea that within his planning horizon the agent does not change his mind.
That is, when the agent reaches period t + k; he ￿nds it optimal to do what
he had planned to do at this period k periods earlier, i.e. at period t9.
When the agent has perfect foresight (n = +1), it is readily veri￿ed
that an LFE-(p;+1) exists and that it coincides with the standard perfect
foresight optimal plan. This is a simple adaptation/generalization of Strotz
(1956)￿s result (it is due to the exponential character of the discounting). It is
also immediate to see that a limited foresight equilibrium LFE-n corresponds
to a p-controlled n-equilibrium or LFE-(p;n) with a planning horizon of p = 1
and that any LFE-(p;n) is also a LFE-n.
In general, while an LFE-(1;n) always exists, an LFE-(p;n) need not
exist when p > 1.10 The next de￿nition suggests looking at those LFE-(p;n)
which have a maximal planning horizon p:
9Rubinstein (1998) suggests as an alternative to Jehiel (1995)￿ s approach a concept in
which the planning horizon p coincides with the horizon of foresight n and condition C is
dropped. But, this in general would result in the decision maker adopting decisions based
on plans that are not followed afterwards, which sounds undesirable (see also Jehiel (1998)
and Lilico (2002) for further discussion of this point).
10For example, consider a case in which a decision-maker must choose between going
up and down at an initial node, and can see that if he goes down the problem ends, but
if he goes up he will later have the option of going up or down at the next stage, but can
see no further ahead than that. There are stage payo⁄s of 1 for going Down at the ￿rst
node and 0 for going Up, and 2 and 0 for going Up or Down (respectively) at the second
node (reached only if Up is chosen at the ￿rst node). Suppose that if he goes up he will
7De￿nition 3 A stream of actions fat (!)gt;! is a ￿ best-controlled n-equilibrium￿
(or ￿ LFEB-n￿ ) if and only if it is an LFE-(p,n) and there is no LFE-(p0,n)
with p0 > p.
The motivation for a best-controlled n-equilibrium is that an agent may
￿nd it desirable to feel he has as much control over his planning scheme as
possible subject to the constraint that he does not change his mind (relative
to plans made earlier)11.
3.2 Preliminary Results
Proposition 1 There always exists an LFE-n. All LFE-n are cyclical - i.e.
9k s.t. 8!;t, at+k(!) = at(!)
Proof. (Sketch) Start from any pro￿le of n-expectations, i.e. f0 (!;a) 2
An. For any !, a￿
f0 (!) is a best-action given f. Construct f￿1 as follows:
For any !, if a is chosen, let !0 denote the new state. Take the sequence
of actions generated by a￿





. Take the truncation of
these to the ￿rst n ones. De￿ne this to be f￿1 (!;a). De￿ne recursively
f￿k (!;a). At some point, because everything is ￿nite, f￿k will correspond
to f￿k0, k 6= k0. This allows us to show existence and the cyclical nature of
limited foresight plans. N.B. this is analogous to Jehiel (1995).
A simple corollary of Proposition 1 is of course that an LFEB-n always
exists. This is because LFE-1 and LFE-(1;1) are equivalent concepts. So
even though an LFE-(p;n) need not exist when n ￿ 2 and p ￿ 2, an LFEB-n
always exists.
then be able to see to the end of the problem, understanding that going Up will lead to
a further choice of payo⁄s of -3 (for Up) or -5 (for Down), whilst going Down will deliver
a choice between payo⁄s of 2 9 (for Up) and 0 (for Down). In this situation, the LFE-1
equilibrium strategy is (Down, Down, Up, Up). However, there is no LFE-(2,2) strategy.
At the ￿rst node, the optimal 2-plan is (Up, Up), but upon reaching the next node, the
agent would choose Down and not Up, violating the constraint that he should not change
his mind within his planning horizon.
11Clearly, a best-controlled n-equilibrium is an LFE-n equilibrium and it can thus be
viewed as a re￿nement of it.
84 To smoke, or not to smoke? That is the
question...
Now we shall employ the concepts we have introduced to address the question
of why some people might smoke when young, then give up when older. In
so doing we shall interpret a younger (resp. older) person as one with shorter
(resp. longer) horizon of foresight.
We shall make the following simplifying assumptions:
A1) A = fD;Sg : there are two actions, which we shall interpret as Don￿ t
Smoke and Smoke.
A2) !t = (at￿1at￿2:::at￿m) : the state variable is de￿ned to be the m
previous period actions.
A3) 9￿ such that, for all ￿ ￿ ￿, there is one perfect foresight optimal plan,
which is at(!) = D, 8!;t.
In the sequel we shall analyze how the plan of an agent who has limited
foresight varies with his horizon of foresight. A3 tells us that an agent with
perfect foresight chooses D in all states ! and in all periods. In light of the
smoker￿ s problem, A3 sounds plausible to us.
More precisely, we wish to address the following questions. 1) Under
what conditions on the horizon of foresight and the payo⁄ structure are the
stationary plans of always choosing S or always choosing D sustainable? 2)
Can the two stationary plans just de￿ned be simultaneously sustainable? 3)
Can cycling between D and S be sustainable when neither stationary plan
is? 4) Can cycling behavior be sustainable as well as some stationary plan?
In the rest of this Section, we answer these questions through a series of
examples. Stationary plans are referred to as
Plan D : at(!) = D, 8!;t
Plan S : at(!) = S, 8!;t
Non-stationary plans involving cycling behavior will be introduced later.
For each plan that we will consider, we are interested in whether or not there
exists ￿ such that for all ￿ ￿ ￿ this plan is sustainable (as LFE-n or LFEB-n).
This is equivalent12 to checking the sustainability of such a plan (as LFE-n
or LFEB-n) in the special case ￿ = 1. From here on we shall assume that
￿ = 1.
12up to indi⁄erences (that we assume are not present here) in the limit as ￿ goes to 1.
94.1 When the horizon of foresight is long enough
We ￿rst show that when the horizon of foresight n is strictly greater than
the hindsight dependence m, the only possible stationary plan is D.
Proposition 2 For all n ￿ m + 1, Plan D (but not S) is an LFE-n.
This result follows from the observation that stationary LFE-n are not
a⁄ected by the horizon of foresight n as long as n ￿ m + 1 :
Lemma 1 For all n ￿ m + 1, Plan a is an LFE-n if and only if it is an
LFE-(m + 1).
And only plan D can be an LFE-(m + 1) :
Lemma 2 Plan D (but not S) is an LFE-(m + 1).
The above proposition clearly rules out the possibility that plan S is
sustainable for long enough horizons of foresight. However, it does not rule
out the possibility that cycling behavior is also sustainable for n ￿ m+1. As
it turns out, cycling behaviour may be sustainable together with plan D even
for arbitrarily large values of the horizon of foresight n. This is illustrated
through the following example in which m = 1 and the payo⁄s (reading states





Such payo⁄s capture situations in which the decision maker prefers smok-
ing to not smoking when he has not smoked in the recent past, but when he
has smoked in the recent past he dislikes both smoking and non-smoking and
he dislikes smoking even more (say he feels disgust). It is readily veri￿ed that
plan D is the optimal perfect foresight solution because starting to smoke
triggers a great payo⁄ loss to the agent. Thus, assumption A3 holds.
Consider the cyclical plan in which the agent smokes whenever he did not
smoke in the last period and he refrains from smoking otherwise:
10Cyclical plan: for all t, at(! = S) = D and at(! = D) = S.
Clearly, the cyclical plan is an LFE-1, i.e, it is a stable plan when the
agent is myopic (this is because U(D;S) > U(S;S) and U(S;D) > U(D;D)).
Interestingly, the cyclical plan is also an LFE-n for all odd values of the
horizon of foresight n. To see this, let n = 2k + 1 and observe that the
equilibrium condition boils down to the following two inequalities:
1) U(D;S) + k[U(S;D) + U(D;S)] ￿ U(S;S) + k[U(D;S) + U(S;D)]
2) U(S;D) + k[U(D;S) + U(S;D)] ￿ U(D;D) + k[U(S;D) + U(D;S)]
These two conditions simplify into the conditions for the cyclical plan
to be an LFE-1, which hold as explained above. Observe however that the
cyclical plan is not an LFE-n whenever n is an even number. (This is because
say U(S;D) + U(D;S) < U(D;D) + U(S;D).)
Thus, even as the agent￿ s horizon of foresight n gets very large it may be
that the cyclical plan de￿ned above is sustainable as an LFE-n, even though
this cyclical plan cannot be an LFE-n for all arbitrarily large values of n.
A more systematic investigation as to when cycling behaviour may oc-
cur for arbitrarily large horizons of foresight deserves further research. We
suspect that for cycling to be sustainable in such a way it must be that in
at least one state !, U(S;!) < U(D;!), which some smokers might dispute
to be a plausible assumption. (As non-smokers, we tend to ￿nd such an as-
sumption quite plausible!)13 The remaining examples will have the feature
that for all states !, U(S;!) > U(D;!) so that plan S is the only LFE-1.
4.2 When the horizon of foresight is short
We now consider situations in which the horizon of foresight n is smaller
than m + 1. We shall focus attention on proving that for such horizons of
foresight, there are a number of scenarios in which Plan S would be optimal,
and some in which Plan D would not be optimal. We o⁄er the interpretation
that those who smoke may face decision-problems like those below.
In the sequel, we shall specialize to the case of m = 2.
13As a side comment, casual observation suggests that even some experienced agents
give the impression of cycling between smoking and non-smoking, and then the impression
of quitting cigarettes completely, before starting again cycling between smoking and not
smoking. We propose to interpret such patterns of behaviour through the lens of continu-
ously increasing horizons of foresight with payo⁄ structures such as those shown in Table
1.
11When Plan S (but not D) is a limited foresight equilibrium:
Consider the following payo⁄s (reading states horizontally and this-period
actions vertically):
U(a;!) DD DS SD SS
S 11 8 11 9
D 10 4 3 0
Table 2
This system of payo⁄s guarantees that if the agent is patient enough (￿
close to 1), the optimal perfect foresight plan is to never smoke, i.e. Plan D.
Hence, Assumption A3 is satis￿ed. The system of payo⁄s is also such that
in all states !, U(S;!) > U(D;!) so that plan S is the only LFE-1.
We next consider a situation in which the agent predicts one period ahead
but not more, i.e n = 2. We observe that Plan D is not an LFE-2. This is
because:14
U(D;SD) + U(D;DS) < U(S;SD) + U(D;SS):
Thus, anticipating he will not smoke in the next period, the agent would
be better o⁄ smoking today if yesterday he smoked and the day before he
did not. Thus plan D is not an LFE-2.
Finally, Plan S is an LFE-2. This is because the following system of in-
equalities is satis￿ed (checking all possible states):15
1) 2U(S;SS) > U(D;SS) + U(S;DS)
2) U(S;DS) + U(S;SD) > U(D;DS) + U(S;DD)
3) U(S;DD) + U(S;SD) > U(D;DD) + U(S;DD)
4) U(S;SD) + U(S;SS) > U(D;SD) + U(S;DS)
143 + 4 = 7 < 11 = 11 + 0
151) 2 ￿ 9 = 18 > 8 = 0 + 8
2) 8 + 11 = 19 > 15 = 4 + 11
3) 11 + 11 = 22 > 21 = 10 + 11
4) 11 + 9 = 20 > 11 = 3 + 8
12Hence, whatever the state, the agent ￿nds it optimal to choose S today
if he anticipates he will choose S tomorrow.
In the above example, Plan D is an LFE-3, but Plan S is not (see Propo-
sition 2). Additionally, Plan S is an LFE-2, but Plan D is not (see above
calculations). Thus if decision-makers faced such preferences at a time when
their foresight horizon was relatively short (2) they would smoke. If subse-
quently (and unexpectedly) their foresight horizon later became longer they
would switch to not smoking. We shall discuss this further below.
Cycling as a limited foresight equilibrium:
Consider the following payo⁄s
U(a;!) DD DS SD SS
S 95 20 106 13
D 90 15 100 0
Table 3
It is readily veri￿ed that Plan D is the optimal perfect foresight solution
so that Assumption A3 holds. Besides, in all states !, U(S;!) > U(D;!) so
that plan S is the only LFE-1, and U(S;!)￿U(D;!) is weakly increasing as
! moves from DD to DS and SD, SS, which re￿ ects the idea that smoking
relative to non-smoking is all the more enjoyable that one has smoked more
in the (recent) past, i.e. there is something like addiction.
Consider now a foresight n = 2. Plan D is not an LFE-2 because
U(S;DD) + U(D;SD) > 2U(D;DD):
Plan S is not an LFE-2 because
U(D;SD) + U(S;DS) > U(S;SD) + U(S;SS):
We will show that cycling between smoking and not smoking can arise in
a limited foresight equilibrium.
Speci￿cally, consider the following plan:
For all t, at(SD) = D and at(DD) = at(DS) = at(SS) = S.
13This plan gives rise to two possible consumption patterns: DSDSDS
where there is alternation between smoking and non-smoking and SSSS in
which the agent keeps smoking every period. It is readily veri￿ed that the
above cyclical plan is an LFE-2 as
1) U(S;DD) + U(D;SD) > U(D;DD) + U(S;DD)
2) U(S;DS) + U(D;SD) > U(D;DS) + U(S;DD)
3) U(D;SD) + U(S;DS) > U(S;SD) + U(S;SS)
4) U(S;SS) + U(S;SS) > U(D;SS) + U(S;DS)
This illustrates that cycling may emerge for intermediate horizons of fore-
sight when plan D is the perfect foresight solution, and neither plan S nor
plan D is a limited foresight equilibrium.16
When Plan S is a better-controlled plan than Plan D:
Another type of scenario in which people might smoke is one in which,
although both Plans would be equilibria if we took our future behaviour as
exogenous, if we aim to control what we do in the future as far ahead as
possible (as in the LFEB-n concept), there are advantages to smoking.
Consider the following payo⁄s:
U(a;!) DD DS SD SS
S 4 5 14 7
D 8 10 6 ￿2
Table 4
Again, it can be checked that Plan D is the only optimal perfect foresight
plan and plan S is the only LFE-1. Besides, U(S;!)￿U(D;!) is increasing
as ! moves from DD to DS and SD, SS, which re￿ ects the idea of addiction.
Also, both Plans D and S are LFE-2.
16Note however that the above cyclical plan is not an LFE-n for any n > 2; this is
because at state ! = SS the agent would choose D rather than S (so as to bene￿t from
U(D;SD)).
14For Plan D this is because17
1) 2U(D;DD) ￿ U(S;DD) + U(D;SD)
2) U(D;SD) + U(D;DS) ￿ U(S;SD) + U(D;SS)
3) U(D;SS) + U(D;DS) ￿ U(S;SS) + U(D;SS)
4) U(D;DS) + U(D;DD) ￿ U(S;DS) + U(D;SD)
For Plan S this is because18
5) 2U(S;SS) > U(D;SS) + U(S;DS)
6) U(S;DS) + U(S;SD) > U(D;DS) + U(S;DD)
7) U(S;DD) + U(S;SD) > U(D;DD) + U(S;DD)
8) U(S;SD) + U(S;SS) > U(D;SD) + U(S;DS)
Although both Plans D and S are LFE-2s, only Plan S is an LFEB-2.
We know that with p = 1 both Plans are LFE-(1;2)s, since an LFE-(1;2) is
formally equivalent to an LFE-2. Thus for Plan S to be an LFEB-2 but Plan
D not, Plan S must be an LFE-(2;2) but Plan D not. For Plan S to be an
LFE-(2;2) it should be that for all states the best 2-plan is to Smoke in the
current and next period. This requires the following inequalities in addition
to those required for LFE-2:
9) 2U(S;SS) ￿ U(D;SS) + U(D;DS)
10) 2U(S;SS) ￿ U(S;SS) + U(D;SS)
11) U(S;DS) + U(S;SD) ￿ U(D;DS) + U(D;DD)
12) U(S;DS) + U(S;SD) ￿ U(S;DS) + U(D;SD)
13) U(S;DD) + U(S;SD) ￿ U(D;DD) + U(D;DD)
14) U(S;DD) + U(S;SD) ￿ U(S;DD) + U(D;SD)
15) U(S;SD) + U(S;SS) ￿ U(D;SD) + U(D;DS)
171) 2 ￿ 8 = 16 > 10 = 4 + 6
2) 6 + 10 = 16 > 12 = 14 ￿ 2
3) ￿2 + 10 = 8 > 5 = 7 ￿ 2
4) 10 + 8 = 18 > 11 = 5 + 6
185) 2 ￿ 7 = 14 > 3 = ￿2 + 5
6) 5 + 14 = 19 > 14 = 10 + 4
7) 4 + 14 = 18 > 12 = 8 + 4
8) 14 + 7 = 21 > 11 = 6 + 5
1516) U(S;SD) + U(S;SS) ￿ U(S;SD) + U(D;SS)
It is easily veri￿ed that these all hold.
In contrast, the equivalent inequalities for Plan D do not all hold. In
particular, we have19:
U(D;SD) + U(D;DS) < U(S;SD) + U(S;SS)
Thus, when the state is ! = SD, the best 2-plan is not DD, since it is
dominated by SS. So Plan D is not an LFE-(2;2) and Plan S is the sole
LFEB-2.
Once again, if decision-makers faced such preferences at a time when
their foresight horizon was relatively short (2) they might smoke, then if
their foresight horizon later became longer they might again switch to not
smoking.
A tale about the smoker￿ s problem:
In Section 4 we have seen that it is possible to switch the decision of
whether to smoke or not smoke simply by changing the horizon of foresight.
We propose to interpret this in terms of an (unanticipated) change in foresight
over the life-cycle. We suggest that younger people may have less ability
to look ahead into the future than older people, and that this o⁄ers some
insight into why signi￿cant numbers of young people take up smoking, only
to give it up in middle-life.
Let us think for a moment how relevant our examples are to the problem
of why people smoke. How plausible are our payo⁄s - does our result depend
on some very particular arrangement of payo⁄s which is unlikely to exist in
reality?
Think of the payo⁄s shown in Tables 2 and 3. In all states, the agent
instantaneously prefers smoking to non-smoking. Besides, the agent ￿nds
smoking relatively more enjoyable (in terms of immediate payo⁄s) as he has
smoked more in the recent past (U(S;!)￿U(D;!) increases as ! moves from
DD to SS through DS and SD).
Consider now the speci￿c payo⁄s of Table 2. There the least desirable
thing to be doing in any period is to stop smoking having smoked in the last
two periods (U(D;SS) = 0). Anyone who has struggled to stop smoking
will attest to the plausibility of this. The highest payo⁄s come from smoking
196 + 10 = 16 < 21 = 14 + 7
16when smoking has not yet entered a routine stage (U(S;DD) = U(S;SD) =
11). Presumably, since many people go on to be smokers after enduring
the unpleasantness of the ￿rst cigarette, there is probably a period between
just starting and when smoking becomes routine in which smoking is very
enjoyable.
Not smoking in any one period having not smoked previously (U(D;DD) =
10) is not so attractive as the period just after one has begun smoking (which
presumably must be right otherwise who would smoke?), but it is preferable
to smoking once smoking has become routine (U(S;DS) = 8; U(S;SS) = 9).
As non-smokers themselves, the authors have little di¢ culty in believing this.
Taking up smoking again after one has only recently stopped (U(S;DS) =
8) is more attractive than sticking to not smoking (U(D;DS) = 4). Perhaps
this is why it is hard to give up?
Similarly, having started smoking, it is pretty unattractive to go back to
being a non-smoker (U(D;SD) = 3), while smoking is very enjoyable at this
point (U(S;SD) = 11)
In the view of these authors, this set of payo⁄s seems highly intuitive
- indeed compelling. And payo⁄s of this sort lead to the result that people
with a shorter foresight horizon will smoke, while those with a longer foresight
horizon (perhaps those who are older and wiser?) will not.
However, we note that the result is not dependent on the ordering of
the payo⁄s so far discussed. In the payo⁄s shown in Table 4 the ordering
is importantly di⁄erent. In that case, for example, sticking to not smoking
having recently given up (U(D;DS) = 10) is more attractive than going
back to smoking (U(S;DS) = 5). Similarly, not continuing with smoking
having started (U(D;SD) = 6) is higher up the ranking and closer to being
a regular smoker (U(S;SS) = 7) than in the previous example. An agent
with these preferences would appear to ￿nd it easier to give up when he
wants to. It should hardly be surprising that an agent of this sort might
be swayed between smoking and not smoking by the added perspective of a
longer foresight horizon.
We should clarify that we do not model any overlap or transition between
the young decision-maker￿ s problem with a foresight length of 2, and the mid-
life decision-maker￿ s problem with a foresight length of 3. Each problem faced
is regarded as an independent in￿nitely-repeated decision problem. This is
clearly an abstraction, but the change in the foresight horizon which our
analysis considers helps in understanding how the pattern of smoking may
change in the two situations.
175 Relation to other approaches
5.1 Non-exponential discounting
What is the relationship between the limited foresight equilibrium approach
and the literature on non-exponential discounting as pioneered by Strotz
(1956) and revived by Laibson (1997)? The main feature of non-exponential
(or hyperbolic) discounting is that the discounting between the payo⁄s ob-
tained in di⁄erent periods is not a sole function of the distance between the
two periods but also of when these periods actually take place. This litera-
ture typically postulates if ￿t pounds in period t+k are viewed as equivalent
to 1 pound in period t, the scalar ￿t > 1 decreases with t.
At ￿rst sight the criterion used by an agent with limited foresight has
some resemblance with the idea of non-exponential discounting. Indeed the
criterion based on limited forecasts as introduced in De￿nition 1 is as if the
agent discounted completely payo⁄s obtained beyond his horizon of foresight.
Yet, an alternative and equivalent (and in our opinion preferable) view is
that the agent believes (possibly erroneously) that the pattern of payo⁄s
obtained within his horizon of foresight will repeat in￿nitely also beyond his
horizon of foresight and that he uses his normal preference with exponential
discounting to compare the e⁄ect of the various possible actions. Clearly,
with this alternative interpretation, the criterion used by the agent does not
exhibit the kind of non-exponential discounting present in the previously
mentioned literature. But (unlike in the hyperbolic discounting literature)
the agent￿ s expectations beyond the horizon of foresight may be erroneous, as
there is no guarantee that the streams of payo⁄s obtained within the horizon
of foresight will repeat in￿nitely beyond the horizon of foresight.
We might have considered alternative decision-making criteria based on
the limited horizon forecast. For example, we might have parameterized
agents also by their degree of optimism regarding their assessment of what
they do not predict. Or in the line with Jehiel (2001) we might have consid-
ered the possibility that agents￿criteria are also a⁄ected by the realization of
their state of mind regarding how they assess what is to come beyond their
horizon of foresight. We have chosen the criterion based on the simple ex-
trapolation idea because it allows to express our point simply, but the main
insight of our paper (regarding the e⁄ect of a change in the horizon of fore-
sight) would also hold for the alternative criteria just mentioned (for which
there would be no interpretation of the criterion based on non-exponential
18discounting).
As a ￿nal comment on the di⁄erence between limited foresight and hyper-
bolic discounting, observe that in our setup the underlying preferences are
completely standard, and the change in horizons of foresight concerns solely
the cognitive abilities of the agents. Hence the notion of the well-being of
the agent is unambiguously de￿ned in our setting, unlike in the hyperbolic
discounting case in which welfare analysis always depends on the criterion
chosen by the planner (the choice of which time is the right one). This means
that there is no di¢ culty here of speaking of the e⁄ect of a change in the
horizon of foresight on the well-being of the agent.
5.2 Addiction theories
In the Stigler and Becker (1977) tradition, there have been a number of
approaches based on ￿rational addiction￿ , whereby people employ ￿appreci-
ation capital￿which is a⁄ected by consuming. Becker et al. (1994) ￿nd some
empirical evidence for such rational addiction in cigarette consumption where
they establish that sales of cigarettes in the current period decreases if future
prices increase, which they interpret as complementarities between current
and future cigarette consumption (see also Gruber and Koszegi (2001) for
further test of this assumption).
In our model, agents are not fully rational; yet their preferences depend
on past consumption (through the dependence of U(a;!) on the state !).
When U(C;!) ￿ U(D;!) increases as the consumer has smoked more in
the past (which is re￿ ected in the state !), we are inclined to say that our
consumer￿ s preferences exhibit addiction (see the discussion surrounding the
examples in Section 3). By introducing bounded rationality, we are able to
explain a change of consumption path as a result of a change of horizon of
foresight, which we think complements in a new way the literature on rational
addiction.
In a recent paper, Gul and Pesendorfer (2007) proposes a new theory
of harmful addiction in which the mere possibility of cigarette consumption
hurts the agent whether or not he smokes. As argued by the authors, in such a
case taxing cigarettes is not as e⁄ective as banning cigarettes as in the former
case the agent has still the option of consuming cigarettes (the fact that it is
made less attractive can only hurt the agent in Gul-Pesendorfer￿ s model). To
some extent, Gul-Pesendorfer￿ s theory can be viewed as revisiting the classic
theory of addiction when preferences are not de￿ned over consumptions but
19over consumption opportunities. This is complementary to our approach,
which can be viewed as revisiting the classic theory of addiction by adding
some element of cognitive limitations.
5.3 Other cognitive biases
The literature on behavioural economics has emphasized a number of cog-
nitive biases other than limited foresight. These in particular include the
idea of projection bias in which agents exaggerate the degree to which their
future tastes will resemble their current tastes. Loewenstein et al (2003)
have pursued this idea to explain consumption decisions that are generally
attributed to time inconsistency. In particular, they apply their model to
show why agents who are subject to projection bias may smoke too much
early in life minimizing the danger of addiction. To illustrate this idea in
the context of the model of Section 2, an agent subject to projection bias (as
modelled by Loewenstein et al.) would expect future states !t0 to coincide
with the current state !t with some positive probability and he would have
the correct expectation about the period t0 state otherwise. A limiting case
of this model is when the agent thinks the state will stay the same as it is
now in which case the agent chooses the optimal myopic decision (or the
LFE-1 plan in the language of this paper). Another limiting case is when
the agent has perfect foresight, which corresponds to the rational solution.
Intermediate cases like the LFE-n concept correspond to cases that are in
between the myopic case and the fully rational case. However, the cogni-
tive limitations associated with limited foresight and projection bias are very
di⁄erent. To illustrate one, limited foresight assumes that agents￿forecasts
are correct even though limited, which allows us to justify the limited fore-
sight equilibrium concept by a learning story. It is unclear how to interpret
Loewenstein et al.￿ s model of projection bias given that the agent￿ s theory
is hard to interpret from a limited learning perspective. Besides, our focus
is on how improving cognitive abilities (through longer horizons of foresight)
may change the pattern of consumption of goods like cigarettes, which does
not seem to have its counterpart in Loewenstein et al.
Finally, we should mention the work of O￿ Donoghue and Rabin (1999)
which combines both the idea of hyperbolic discounting as a true description
of the underlying preferences and the idea of partial sophistications to de-
scribe the cognitive abilities of the agents. In their approach, a sophisticated
agent is one who is aware of his limited control capabilities and of the nature
20of his preferences. A naive agent is one who behaves as if he could stick to
his plan afterwards, which in reality he cannot, and partial sophistication is
modelled as a convex combination between the two extreme modes of be-
havior outlined above. One should mention that the O￿ Donoghue and Rabin
approach to partial sophistication and the limited foresight approach are very
di⁄erent since again it is not clear how to interpret the partial sophistica-
tion in O￿ Donoghue and Rabin approach from a limited learning perspective
(so the question of how a partially sophisticated agent would behave as in
O￿ Donoghue and Rabin approach seems insu¢ ciently justi￿ed to us).
One other advantage of our approach over that employed by O￿ Donoghue
and Rabin is that the notion of the well-being of the agent is unambiguously
de￿ned in our setting, unlike in the hyperbolic discounting case in which
welfare analysis always depends on the criterion chosen by the planner (the
choice of which time is the right one). Relatedly, the two approaches lead to
di⁄erent policy recommendations. In our case a fully rational agent is always
better o⁄than a partially rational agent, which need not be so in O￿ Donoghue
and Rabin￿ s approach. It follows that increasing the cognitive ability of the
agent by for example making agents more aware of the usual consumption
patterns (social learning) seems always desirable in our framework while it
may be detrimental in O￿ Donoghue and Rabin￿ s approach.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have o⁄ered one interpretation of why people start smoking
only to give it up later: as people grow older they gain a longer-term perspec-
tive which changes the balance of advantage away from smoking and towards
not smoking. We contend that the preferences required to obtain this result
are interpreted plausibly in terms of scenarios in which people start smoking
only to give it up later.
The limited foresight perspective adopted in this paper is not merely a
reinterpretation of hyperbolic discounting models. We believe it suggests
policy implications that are very di⁄erent from those that derive from the
hyperbolic discounting literature. One clear way to improve the well-being
of agents in the present framework is to inform them better about the e⁄ects
of their choices and the likely consumption patterns that follow from their
current consumption. That is, increasing agents￿horizon of foresight is always
bene￿cial. With the hyperbolic discounting view, policy interventions are
21viewed in a very di⁄erent way: cigarettes should be taxed so as to better
align the incentive of the current self with the long term well-being of the
agent. But, a uniform tax applied to agents with di⁄erent taste parameters
and also di⁄erent horizons of foresight may be detrimental in our context with
limited foresight and exponential discounting (in particular, those who have
perfect foresight can only su⁄er from a tax as in Gul and Pesendorfer￿ s theory
of harmful addiction). We believe more experimental/empirical work should
be devoted to the issue of disentangling the taste preferences of the agents
from their cognitive limitations so as to better design policy interventions.
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Proof of Lemma1:
Proof. Assume, without loss of generality, that a = D (we could simply
reverse symbols if a = S).
If Plan D is an LFE-(m+1) then the following 2m inequalities must hold
(2m because there is one inequality for each possible state at time t, and
there are 2m di⁄erent possible states):
1) (m+1)U(D;D:::D) ￿ U(S;D:::D)+U(D;SD:::D)+:::+U(D;D:::DS)




2m) U(D;S:::S) + ::: + U(D;D:::D) ￿ U(S;S:::S) + ::: + U(D;D:::DS)
These inequalities state that, for every possible state at t, it is better to
play D this period than to play S, on the assumption that D will be played
thereafter.
If Plan D is an LFE-n there will again be 2m inequalities (only 2m be-
cause there are still only 2m possible states, even though there is now greater
foresight). Now the sum of the payo⁄s from playing D this period (the left-
hand side) for any state at t would di⁄er from the inequalities above by the
presence of an additional n￿m￿1 added terms of U(D;D:::D). But the sum
of payo⁄s from playing S this period (the right hand side) would, likewise,
di⁄er only by the presence of the same additional n ￿ m ￿ 1 added terms of
U(D;D:::D).
Thus, for example, inequality (2) would be modi￿ed to read
20) U(D;SD:::D) + ::: + U(D;D:::D) + (n ￿ m ￿ 1)U(D;D:::D) ￿
U(S;SD:::D) + ::: + U(D;D:::DS) + (n ￿ m ￿ 1)U(D;D:::D)
but this simpli￿es back to equation (2). Hence the required inequalities
are equivalent, and whenever they are satis￿ed Plan D will be both an LFE-
(m + 1) and an LFE-n, and whenever they are not all satis￿ed, Plan D will
be neither an LFE-(m + 1) nor a LFE-n.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Proof. If Plan D is optimal with perfect foresight, then the in￿nite
stream of payo⁄s received from playing D every period must be greater than
that from playing S this period then playing D thereafter, for any state. But
24after period t + m, if D is being played from period t + 1, all subsequent
payo⁄s will be U(D;D:::D), regardless of whether D or S is played in period
t since there are only m elements in the state variable. That means that
when Plan D is optimal with perfect foresight, the 2m inequalities of the
proof of Lemma 1 must hold, which is a su¢ cient condition for Plan D to be
an LFE-(m + 1).
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. (Sketch) Note that since (by assumption) Plan S is not optimal
with perfect foresight, it cannot be true that a set of 2m inequalities equivalent
to those in the proof of Lemma 1 hold. Hence Plan S is not an LFE-(m+1).
By Lemma 1 this implies that Plan S is not an LFE-n for any n > m + 1
either. This should help to verify Proposition 2.
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